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1.   Introduction 
Professors Wellon and Piston’s report entitled “The Role of Law 
and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1960-1995” 
provides very valuable information on the evolution of corporate 
laws in six Asian countries. It shows how these laws were 
transplanted from the UK, the US, Germany and France to the 
various countries and how they have progressed in response to 
changing economic circumstances. Wellon and Piston’s general 
conclusion with respect to this area of law for the sample 
countries is that “legal change responded to economic change 
rather than leading it and refutes the proposition that law is a 
determinant for patterns of external finance” (p. 160). The authors 
provide persuasive evidence and analysis in support of this view. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to build on the Wellon - Piston 
analysis and to make two specific proposals for the further 
evolution of corporate law in Asian countries. The first of these 
proposals is designed to deal with important aspects of the current 
  1economic and financial crisis in  South East and East Asia. It 
addresses the problem of corporate restructuring in these countries 
in the wake of the economic crisis and considers specifically the 
case of South Korea. The second proposal is concerned with the 
more general issue of corporate governance in semi-industrial 
countries and refers particularly to the Indian situation. The two 
proposals are not, however, entirely independent. The first 
proposal could potentially have significant implications for 
corporate governance while the second proposal is also likely to 
be helpful in the restructuring of the Asian economies as they 
begin to recover from the crisis.  
 
The next two sections set out in turn the two proposals and outline 
their respective contexts and the reasons for making them.  
 
II. Corporate and Financial Sector Restructuring in Asia 
An important analyses of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which 
suddenly, and simultaneously, devastated the hitherto highly 
successful economies of East Asia, has ascribed its fundamental 
causes to the underlying model of ‘state directed capitalism’ 
which most of these countries followed.  This causal linking of the 
acute economic crisis to the ‘Asian model of capitalism’ has not 
just been confined to distinguished financial journalists and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
1 This short paper draws on my previous papers, Singh (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1999) and Singh and 
  2popular commentators, but is a view endorsed by the highest 
circles in government, and international institutions in 
Washington.
2  Indeed, following this type of analysis, the IMF 
policy programme for the crisis-affected countries required them 
to institute fundamental structural reforms to their economic 
systems.  They were asked to change, among many other things, 
their systems of corporate governance, labour laws, and 
competition policies so as to rid these economies of “crony 
capitalism”, “non-transparency” and myriad market rigidities (e.g. 
life-time employment in the largest South Korean firms).   
 
Singh (1998, 1999) and Singh and Weisse (1999) have 
systematically examined this thesis and have found that it is 
seriously flawed. They conclude that this analysis is not only 
incorrect, but that the policy recommendations based on it are 
likely to prolong the crisis rather than alleviate it whilst also 
undermining the prospects for long-term growth.  These papers 
suggest that the “deeper” reasons for the crisis do not lie in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Weisse (1998), to which the reader is referred for data and evidence and for citations to the relevant literature. 
2 Thus, Mr. Greenspan, the cautious chairman of the US Federal Reserve, in his testimony 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggested that, in the last decade or so, the 
world has observed “a consensus towards, for want of a better term, the Western form of free-
market capitalism as the model which should govern how each individual country should run 
its economy…We saw the breakdown of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the massive shift away 
from central planning towards free market capitalist types of structures.  Concurrent to that 
was the really quite dramatic, very strong growth in what appeared to be a competing 
capitalist-type system in Asia.  And as a consequence of  that, you had developments of types 
of structures which I believe at the end of the day were faulty, but you could not demonstrate 
  3dirigiste model of the Asian capitalism, but rather in too little 
government control over corporate and financial sector activity   
following the financial liberalisation process  implemented in the 
period immediately preceding the financial crisis. 
 
However, regardless of the causes of the crisis, since it has 
occurred there is general agreement among analysts that the 
corporate sector in affected countries needs restructuring.  The 
problem is particularly serious in relation to the chaebol, the joint 
conglomerate firm, in South Korea. 
 
Although the Korean economy staged a spectacular recovery in 
1999, the crisis of corporate restructuring is far from being over.  
The recovery is fragile.  Daewoo, the fifth largest chaebol, is on 
the verge of bankruptcy.  Samsung, the largest conglomerate, has 
seen its share price fall by 50% in the recent period, which has 
depressed the whole Korean market. Another leading 
conglomerate, Hyundai, is also facing serious difficulties.  The 
Financial Times (November 6, 2000) reports on the problems the 
Korean conglomerates and government face in relation to 
corporate restructuring:  
 
Worries about labour unrest increased over the weekend after a violent 
protest at Samsung's truck plant in Taegu. Workers burnt vehicles and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that so long as growth was going at 10 percent a year.”  See further statements by Larry 
Summers and the former Director General of the IMF Michael Camdessus in Singh 1999. 
  4barricaded production facilities when it was announced that Samsung 
Commercial Vehicles would be liquidated under a programme by banks to 
close 29 troubled companies. Analysts believe the government may not 
want to place Daewoo Motor under court receivership when it must also 
deal with the possible collapse of Hyundai Engineering & Construction, 
the nation's biggest builder.  The head of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission, Korea's restructuring agency, yesterday said the government 
might allow creditors to place Hyundai Construction under a restructuring 
programme after a debt-for-equity swap.  Lee  Keun-young, the FSC 
chairman, said this was preferable to court receivership for Hyundai 
Construction, which would have "a big impact on the national economy".  
 
A main issue here is what kind of corporate restructuring is 
desirable and how it should be carried out? Is the Anglo-Saxon 
corporate and financial system, based on the stock market and a 
freely functioning market for corporate control (“free market 
capitalism” as Alan Greenspan calls it) the only viable alternative 
to the existing system? It will be argued that it is not; the 
paragraphs below outline a different system of corporate 
restructuring which is likely to be both more feasible and more 
beneficial to the crisis economies than the IMF recommended free-
market system.  
 
The Korean chaebol had exceptionally high debt/equity ratios 
prior to the crisis and many of them became technically bankrupt 
as the crisis hit the economy. The crisis has also led to the 
financial sector being burdened with enormous bad debts. To 
reduce the indebtedness of the chaebol and to restore financial 
viability to the corporate system and hence to the banking industry 
- both of which are necessary for sustaining successful recovery of 
  5the real economy - a huge public bailout has been required at the 
expense of the tax payers.. The government has been obliged to 
effectively re-nationalise the banking industry.  
 
However, reform of the chaebol, as suggested by the Financial 
Times report, is meeting increasing resistance from workers as 
well as the general public who feel that the burden of adjustment 
process is not being fairly distributed.  In addition, there is public 
disquiet about the foreign take-overs of the chaebol assets 
envisaged in the IMF-inspired market-based government 
restructuring policy.  Even if the government lets Daewoo go into 
liquidation, and allows some of its assets to be sold to foreigners 
and thereby pay a heavy political price, it is unlikely to either 
have the ability or the desire to repeat this process with another 
big conglomerate such as Hyundai.  In order to carry out 
successful restructuring of the chaebol, without harming their 
economic efficiency and sacrificing their proven record of huge 
contributions to the wealth and prosperity of the Korean economy, 
the Government needs to fundamentally rethink its basic approach 
and policy perspective. 
 
The essential proposal of this paper is that instead of abandoning 
the Asian model of social co-operation and of close business-
government relationship, the present Korean government or its 
  6successor should renew and extend it to workers, trade unions, and 
civil society organisations as part of a national programme to 
resolve the economic situation.  
 
One way of achieving this objective would be for the government 
to swap its loans in the chaebol for equity and offer some of these 
to workers and  trade unions in order to secure their co-operation. 
In other words, the current sacrifice of the workers in terms of 
lower wages or lay-offs could be compensated for by giving them a 
tangible stake in the success of the restructuring process. The 
government should also create a social fund with the remaining 
equity in order to provide either social security for the future, or 
a straight forward social dividend when the economy has recovered 
for workers in the non-chaebol smaller enterprises.  This would 
help to compensate the latter for having suffered greater 
unemployment and wage cuts relative those who work in the 
chaebol.
3  These are measures designed to ensure some equality of 
sacrifice in the restructuring process. 
 
However, it will be both socially desirable and economically 
efficient to go further. Workers and civil society organisations 
may be given a direct role in corporate governance. The chaebol 
are so huge that their strategic commercial decisions (where to 
                                                      
3 See You 1998. 
  7invest, how much to invest) have a major impact not only on those 
directly concerned with the enterprise (e.g. workers, suppliers) 
but also on the local community and the region at large. There is 
little social justification for these large corporations to be run in 
the sole interests of the shareholders. Social justice requires that 
other stakeholders’ interests are also properly taken into account.  
 
In terms of corporate law, this inevitably means a dilution of the 
property rights of the shareholders which some would regard as 
leading to inefficient economic outcomes. However, particularly 
in the present crisis in South Korea, such dilution is not only 
socially and politically desirable but depending on the form it 
takes, there are good reasons to think that it would also be 
economically efficient. One approach would be for Korea to 
adopt some version of the German system of co-determination and 
two-tier boards. The top tier which sets the strategic direction of 
the corporation could have not just  workers and management 
representatives, as is the case in Germany, but also 
representation from the government and the local community. 
 
Such an institutional change would benefit the economy in a 
number of ways.  Very briefly, firstly it would help to change the 
bitter relations between trade unions and the chaebol owners as 
the whole emphasis of the proposal would be on social co-
  8operation as opposed to adversarial conflict.  Secondly, it would 
re-focus the terms of the current dispute between the unions, the 
chaebol and the government.  Since the crisis, the main issue 
between these three parties has been the question of labour 
market flexibility and employment protection.
4 The proposed 
institutional reforms would put on the agenda important issues of 
participation and democratic involvement in the management of 
the chaebol and the economy as a whole.
5  Thirdly, the presence 
of the government, civil society and union representatives on 
supervisory boards would help to improve corporate governance, 
reduce the agency problems, promote accountability and 
transparency of the chaebol well into the twenty first century.
6  
Fourthly, it would preserve the economic benefits of the chaebol 
as an organisational form.  Other scholars have pointed out large 
conglomerate organisations such as the chaebol are ubiquitous in 
the third world and there are good economic reasons for this. 
Further, evidence suggests that, contrary to the experience of the 
                                                      
4 See further You (1998) and Kim (1998). 
5 These were promised by President Kim Dae Jung at the beginning of his term of office, but subsequently 
questions of participation have simply been forgotten in the stalemate which has developed on the question of 
labour market flexibility.  See further You (1998). 
6 Stiglitz (1985) has observed that even in large Anglo-Saxon enterprises where there is separation of ownership 
and control, workers are one group who have both the incentive and the ability to monitor the activities of 
managers.  He argues that this task is not performed at all well by the market for corporate control or by the 
banking system (see further Section 3). 
  9conglomerate firms in advanced countries, developing countries 
conglomerate, tend to be more efficient than other firms.
7
 
III. Corporate governance and emerging markets.  
Guiding future market evolution. 
 
The second proposal concerns the general question of corporate 
governance in semi-industrial countries. The background to this 
proposal may be summarised as follows. 
 
Developing countries witnessed a historically unprecedented 
growth of stock markets in the 1980s and 90s. Between 1983 
and 1993 the total combined capitalization of companies 
quoted on the 38 emerging markets included in the 
Economist's list rose from less than a hundred billion to 
nearly a trillion US dollars. Over this period, a number of 
leading individual emerging markets (e.g. Mexico, Korea and 
Thailand) recorded a more than twenty-fold increase in total 
market capitalization. By the early 1990s the size of these 
stock markets was comparable  to  those of medium-sized 
advanced country markets in Europe.  
 
                                                      
7 There is an analytical reason for this phenomenon: developing countries suffer to a much greater degree from 
missing or incomplete markets than advanced economies.  In these circumstances, the conglomerate organisation 
may be optimal. See further Khanna (2000) and Khanna and Palepu (1997). 
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this period may be judged from the fact that it probably took 
85 years (1810-1895) for the US capitalization ratio (market 
capitalisation as a proportion of GDP) to rise from 7% to 
71%. In contrast, the corresponding Taiwanese ratio jumped 
from 11% to 74% in just 10 years between 1981 and 1991. 
Similarly, between 1983 and 1993 the Chilean ratio rose from 
13.2% to 78%; the Korean from 5.39% to 36.2% and the Thai 
from 3.8% to 55.8%.
8
 
The breadth and depth of the stock market development in 
industrialising countries in the 1980s and 90s may be 
illustrated by considering the specific case of India. 
Compared with many other semi-industrial countries, India 
has been rather conservative in initiating financial 
liberalisation. The Indian stock market cannot literally be 
regarded as an emerging market since the first stock market 
was established in the country as long ago as 1875.  
However, up to 1980 stock market development had ebbed 
and flowed but in general had been quite slow. In 1980-81 
total market capitalization in the Indian stock market as a 
proportion of GDP was only 5%. As a result of the 
liberalisation measures initiated in the 1980s, by 1990 the 
                                                      
8 See further Mullins (1993), Singh and Weisse (1998). 
  11ratio had risen to 13%. With the major change in 
government policy and the acceleration of the pace of 
liberalisation in 1991, stock market growth became 
explosive. By the end of 1993, total market 
capitalization had reached 60% of GDP. The number of 
shareholders and investors in mutual funds rose from 2 
million in 1981 to 40 million in 1993,a figure second 
only to the US(51 million). In terms of  listed companies 
the Indian stock market(over 8ooo companies in 1997) is 
today  the largest in the world, larger even than the US. 
The average daily trading volume on the Bombay stock 
market in the early 1990s was about the same as that in 
London - about 45,000 trades a day. At the peak of stock 
market activity  trading occurred at double that rate.  
 
There are however three points which may be noted with respect 
to the stock market growth in India and other leading emerging 
markets during the 1980s and 90s. 
a) Stock market development was not a wholly spontaneous 
response to market forces but was often heavily assisted by 
government measures. 
b) Although there has been rapid expansion of emerging 
markets during the last two decades, it should be emphasized 
that even the most advanced ones among them are far from 
  12being fully mature. In many dimensions (for example the 
thickness of the market) developing countries’ stock markets 
have still got a long way to go. Most emerging markets also 
suffer from a wide range of informational and other 
regulatory deficiencies (e.g. with respect to transparency of 
transactions; high incidence of insider trading. 
c) The data indicating the very fast growth of emerging 
markets refers to the 1980s up to about the mid-1990s. 
Currently most developing country stock markets are at a low 
ebb and therefore the present values of indicators for stock 
market development are likely to be much below what they 
were earlier in the decade. 
 
Notwithstanding the current declines in share prices, the 
financial community in India and elsewhere is eager for a further 
development of the stock market. They would like the 
Government to  permit or facilitate the establishment of a market 
for corporate control. Such a market, it is argued, is required in 
order to maximise the benefits from stock market development. In 
the crisis-affected countries the IMF is encouraging such  
markets, often as a part of its conditionality. 
 
Although there are embryonic markets for corporate control in a 
few developing countries (e.g. Brazil, India), most do not yet 
  13have hostile take-overs and fully-fledged markets for control. 
The main burden of the second proposal in this paper is for the 
governments of the emerging markets to resist the establishment 
of a take-overs market. They should certainly take no steps to 
facilitate it - indeed, in my view, they should go further and 
actively discourage it. The reasons for this proposal have been 
set out at length in Singh (1998b), these are summarised below. . 
 
In text-book theory, take-overs provide an important additional 
mechanism through which the stock market can promote a more 
efficient allocation and utilization of a society’s capital 
resources. However, more recent economic analyses suggest a 
number of reasons why the  virtues of such a market may not 
actually materialise in the real world. The more important of 
these factors are:  
a) inherent imperfections in the actual stock markets even 
in advanced economies whereby it is far easier for a large 
firm to take over a small one rather than the other way 
around;  
b)  the lack of necessary information required by the 
relevant economic agents for the takeover disciplinary 
system to work adequately;  
c) huge transaction costs, particularly in contested take-
overs;  
  14d) the so-called free-rider problem noted by Grossman and 
Hart in a seminal paper in 1980. 
 
Further, empirical evidence from advanced countries such as the 
USA and UK, where these markets have long been in existence, 
indicate several drawbacks particularly from the perspective of 
economic development. 
a) Take-overs greatly intensify the normal stock market 
pressures towards speculation and short term returns. 
b) There is no evidence that the market works in such a way as 
to always punish the inefficient and unprofitable companies 
and reward the efficient ones. Empirically, selection in the 
market for corporate control occurs much more on the 
dimension of size than that of profitability or the firm’s 
stock market valuation. 
c) An active market for corporate control is likely to seriously 
distort the incentive system facing corporate managers. In 
Japan and Germany, which do not have markets for corporate 
control, managers are induced to seek the organic growth of 
the corporation. In contrast, incentives in the Anglo Saxon 
system emphasize financial engineering and growth by 
merger. 
d) In view of the existence of large domestic conglomerate 
enterprises in India as in many other developing countries, a 
  15freely functioning market for corporate control runs serious 
dangers of increasing concentration of industry as well as 
stifling the development of small and medium-sized efficient 
firms. 
e) It is particularly relevant for developing countries to bear 
in mind not only the enormous transaction costs involved in 
take-over activity but also the very large unfavourable re-
distributions of wealth it often leads to. 
 
In India there are admittedly serious problems with the present 
system of corporate governance: conflicts of interest and lack of 
cohesion among many controlling families, the adverse effects of 
large interlocking, inter-group investments on small shareholders 
in the group companies; the total exclusion of ordinary 
shareholders from decisions with respect to corporate re-
structuring, mergers, divestments etc. Corporate governance 
systems  in large private corporations in other emerging markets 
no doubt have their own similar difficulties. It may therefore 
appear attractive to deal with the whole gamut of such 
governance problems through the invisible hand of the market - 
by the institution of the take-over mechanism. However the 
evidence from advanced countries suggests that the end result of 
this whole process may not necessarily be better and could be 
considerably worse than the current situation. Developing 
  16country governments are better advised to follow the example of 
Japan, Germany and other countries in Europe and attempt to find 
different ways of solving these governance problems. Emerging 
markets simply cannot afford the burden of an extremely 
expensive and a hit and miss system of management change which 
take-overs present. 
 
If developing country governments were to accept the proposal 
outlined here and discourage the emergence of a take-overs 
market, complementary actions would be required in two 
important areas. First, the governments would need to encourage 
alternative systems of monitoring and disciplining inefficient 
corporate managements. These may well, for example, take the 
form of worker, community and government representation on the 
top tier boards of large corporations, as outlined above in the 
first proposal. However, these arrangements may also take other 
forms depending on a country’s labour history and other 
circumstances. The second group of complementary policies, in 
the absence of a market for corporate control, would involve 
promoting greater competition in the product markets. In the 
normal calculus of a capitalist economy, such competition is the 
main constraint on inefficient managements. However, many 
developing countries such as India are deficient in this area.  
Parenthetically, recent research however, indicates that contrary 
  17to popular pre-conceptions, the intensity of competition in the 
product markets in manufacturing in semi-industrial countries is 
often no less than that observed for advanced economies.  (See 
further Glen et al, 2000; Tybout, 2000).  Nevertheless, in the 
current context of the privatisation of former public monopolies, 
as well as the huge international merger wave which is creating 
ever bigger firms with increasing market power, many emerging 
markets need to institute competition policies of the appropriate 
kind (which is not necessarily the US type of anti-trust policy).
9  
These countries need to reduce barriers to entry, whether private 
or public, and stimulate greater domestic product market 
competition. 
IV  Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined two proposals which bear on the 
increasingly important question of corporate governance in 
emerging markets.  These proposals challenge the conventional 
wisdom on the subject.  The nature and extent of their 
application to a particular country will depend upon its specific 
circumstances.  The legal changes in corporate and other laws 
required to give effect to either of these proposals are unlikely 
to cause any difficulties. 
                                                      
9 For a fuller analysis of these questions, specifically the issue of appropriate competition policy in developing 
countries, see further Singh and Dhumale (1999). 
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